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Abstract 
This paper thoroughly studied the methodology of CCMR analysis, clarified the relationship between CCMR analysis, 
specific risk analysis, and MSG-3 analysis through discussion of a real certification program. Provided a lessons 
learned case and reference to other aircraft type design and certification. 
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1. Introduction 
In the civil aircraft development and type certification, System Safety Analysis (SSA) is one of the 
most important works. Identifying Candidate Certification Maintenance Requirements (CCMR) as part of 
SSA aims to compensate the hidden nature of latent failures. 
CCMR analysis is the basis of identification of Certification Maintenance Requirement (CMR), which 
is an important input to the Maintenance Review Board (MRB) process. In aircraft type certification, 
CCMR is also one of the certification representative’s interests. In a recent foreign aircraft Validation 
Type Certification (VTC) program, confusion of CCMR analysis and other aircraft development activities 
was noticed. Incorrect analysis process was used and wrong result was deduced. Therefore, a thorough 
study of CCMR analysis and clarification of the differences with other aircraft development activities are 
deemed necessary. 
This paper thoroughly studied the CCMR analysis process, and clarified the relationship between 
CCMR analysis and other aircraft development activities, for instance, specific risk analysis and 
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Maintenance Steering Group-3 (MSG-3) analysis. Provide a lessons learned case and reference to other 
aircraft type design and certification. 
2. The definition and analysis process of CCMR 
2.1. Related Terminologies 
Before starting the CCMR analysis process, some terminologies should be clarified: 
x Latent Failure and Significant Latent Failure [1]: A failure is latent until it is made known to the flight 
crew or maintenance personnel. A significant latent failure is one, which would in combination with 
one or more specific failures, or events result in a Hazardous or Catastrophic Failure Condition. 
x CCMR [1]: A periodic maintenance or flight crew check may be used in a safety analysis to help 
demonstrate compliance with 25.1309(b) for Hazardous and Catastrophic Failure Conditions. Where 
such checks cannot be accepted as basic servicing or airmanship they become CCMRs). 
x CMR [2]: A CMR is a required scheduled maintenance task established during the design certification 
of the airplane systems as an operating limitation of the Type Certificate (TC) or Supplemental Type 
Certificate (STC). The CMRs are a subset of the instructions for continued airworthiness identified 
during the certification process. A CMR usually results from a formal, numerical analysis conducted to 
show compliance with the requirements applicable to catastrophic and hazardous failure conditions. 
Compliance may also result from a qualitative, engineering judgment-based analysis. 
The CCMRs identified in SSA process should be submitted to the Certification Maintenance 
Coordination Committee (CMCC). The CMCC then discusses all CCMRs and selects CMRs. As for how 
to define CMRs from CCMRs is not within the scope of this paper. 
Typically, the significant latent failures should be eliminated through design compensation. For 
instance, adding a practical and reliable monitoring and warning system to turn the latent failure into a 
dominant failure, and warn the flight crew when failure detected. Then the flight crew could take action 
following the defined procedure to ensure the flight safety. Another example is adjusting the system 
architecture by adding system redundancy. However, significant latent failures could not be eliminated 
completely sometimes due to technique, cost, weight or other factors. Risk management method should 
then be used to control the significant latent failure. CMR is just one of the feasible and efficient ways of 
risk management. Therefore, CCMR analysis, as a method of inspection and compensation to the 
significant latent failures, is important in aircraft design development. 
2.2. CCMR Analysis Process 
Guidance related with CCMR analysis could be found in Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309 (Arsenal) [1] /EASA Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) 25.1309[3]
and FAA AC 25-19A [2]. But neither of the guidance materials gave a detail and clear process for CCMR 
analysis.
Based on the definition and general requirements in the guidance material, the CCMR analysis process 
is summarized as below: 
The prerequisite of CCMR analysis should be the completion of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). “Tasks 
that are candidates for selection as CMRs usually come from safety analyses (e.g., SSA, which establishes 
whether there is a need for tasks to be carried out periodically to comply with 25.1309, and other 
requirements requiring this type of analysis. The SSA should identify as CCMRs the maintenance tasks 
intended to detect latent failures that would, in combination with one or more specified failures or events, 
lead to a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition.”[2] Therefore, CCMR analysis should start after the 
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first loop of system analysis with the system architecture developed. CCMR analysis is a kind of 
inspection of the system architecture. Especially, it ensures the rationality and safety of the existence of 
latent failures. Once the latent failures were identified, maintenance tasks should be developed or 
evaluated. “Where such checks cannot be accepted as basic servicing or airmanship they become 
CCMRs.” [1] And “rational methods, which usually involve quantitative analysis, or relevant service 
experience should be used to determine check intervals [2].” In some situations, the task interval per 
analysis may equal to or greater than the life of aircraft, “some inspections in the life of the aircraft are 
necessary to avoid undue exposure to catastrophic or hazardous “single failure” situations, therefore a 
qualitative assessment to determine the required maintenance before end of airplane life is still 
necessary.” [2]
Besides tasks from SSA, “tasks may also be selected from those intended to inspect for impending 
failures due to wear out. ”[2] “Other tasks that are not derived from numerical analysis of significant latent 
failures, but are based on properly justified engineering judgment, can also be candidates for CMRs. The 
justification should include the logic leading to identification as a candidate CMR, and the data and 
experience base supporting the logic.” [2]
Detail CCMR analysis process flow is illustrated in figure 1 and explanation to each step is as follow. 
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Figure 1, CCMR analysis process 
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(1) CCMR analysis starts from the fault trees of hazardous and catastrophic failure conditions. If the 
fault tree is not for hazardous and catastrophic failure condition, CCMR analysis is not needed. 
(2) For every latent failure in the fault tree, process the complete following analysis. If there is no 
latent failure or event with exposure time greater than one flight in the fault tree, CCMR analysis is not 
needed. 
(3) If top event probability can be met using aircraft lifetime as latent failure exposure time, go to step 
(4); 
(4) Perform qualitative assessment to determine the required maintenance before end of airplane life to 
avoid undue exposure to catastrophic or hazardous “single failure” situations. 
(5) If the aircraft lifetime cannot be used as the latent failure exposure time, and no maintenance task 
could detect the latent failure, then the design is inadequate and a trade-off study should be opened to 
evaluate alternatives. 
(6) If an MRB task could detect the latent failure, engineering judgment and experience on similar 
aircraft types should be used to assess whether the maintenance action considered as routine maintenance 
activity (MRB task). Where such tasks cannot be accepted as basic servicing or airmanship they become 
CCMRs. The assessment of whether tasks are basic servicing or airmanship is subject to engineering 
judgment, where the uniqueness of function, system or equipment, complexity and frequency of the task 
procedure, similarity to maintenance tasks on previous similar aircraft types, etc. should also be 
considered.  
 (7) If there is an MRB task, the inspection interval of that task should be appropriate to meet the fault 
tree top event probability requirement. Assume two system failures resulting in catastrophic or hazardous 
failure condition, one failure (system 1) is latent, and the other (system 2) is not, no sequential 
requirement. The task interval of the latent failure is defined as [4]˖
  T= P/(¬1¬ 2 t)                                                                                                                               (1) 
Where:  
T: Latent failure inspection interval; 
P: Probability of catastrophic or hazardous top event (per flight hour); 
¬1: Failure rate of system 1, per flight hour; 
¬2: Failure rate of system 2, per flight hour; 
t: Hours per flight. 
If the interval is not sufficient, it may need to be a CCMR; if it is sufficient, check the sensitivity to 
escalation in step (8). 
(8) For the MRB task developed with task interval meets the top event probability, the sensitivity to 
escalation needs to be assessed. Because the MRB task interval can be escalated in service, while the 
CCMR task interval intends to meet the top event of catastrophic or hazardous failure conditions, it 
should be controlled and cannot be escalated casually. If necessary, possible future MRB intervals 
escalation and specific limits to escalation could be provided to maintenance program engineering to 
ensure proper controls are followed by MRBR system.  
(9) If the MRB task interval cannot meet the top event probability, or there is not enough escalation 
margin (per AC25.19A, some applicants have applied, and the Authorities have accepted, a factor of one 
half of the CMR interval as a margin to guard against potential escalation of FEC 8 (Failure Effect 
Category) task intervals beyond the intervals specified by the CMR), other factors (for instance, shorter 
task interval) need to be considered. In this case, coordination with maintenance personnel and authority 
is deemed necessary. The coordination may include conservatism in exposure time or failure rates, fault 
tree assumptions, design robust, etc.. 
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A: If it is determined not to be a CCMR, the rationale for the conclusion should be documented in the 
SSA document. 
B: Ideal situation is that no latent failure falls into this step. Otherwise, system architecture should be 
re-assessed by trade-off study, since the system with latent failure lives like this is deemed unsafe. 
C: Where engineering judgment concludes that a CCMR is appropriate, necessary information should 
be provided to CMCC to ensure the CMCC understands exact latent failure that the task is designed to 
find. Following in-service experience, the Industry Steering Committee (ISC)/MRB committee can 
provide the findings and possibly petition for a CMR interval change or CMR deletion. 
3. CCMR Certification Practice 
During the aircraft type certification, the CCMR analysis, as part of the system safety assessment, is 
usually one of the certification personnel’s concern points. 
In a recent foreign aircraft validation type certification program, certification representative noticed 
that no CCMR was identified to the hydraulic actuated thrust reverser system. However, based on 
certification representative’s experience, the mechanical failures of actuator locks and cowl lock are 
usually considered as CCMRs. And the applicant also stated that the inspection tasks to the mechanical 
failures of actuator locks and cowl lock were “added” into MSG-3 analysis. By definition, the MSG-3 
analysis intends to address “failure +1” (one and another failure) condition, which cannot identify all 
failure conditions of the 3 lines of defense thrust reverser system. Therefore, the CCMR analysis of thrust 
reverser system was chose to be reviewed thoroughly. 
Two mistakes was identified in the thrust reverser CCMR analysis report: (1) misunderstood the 
definition of significant latent failure with specific risk of concern; (2) failed to identify CCMR, even 
though inspection tasks were deduced from FTA to satisfy the risk probability of top level event, and 
added the tasks into MSG-3 analysis unreasonably. The following sections will discuss the two mistakes 
separately. 
3.1.  Significant Latent Failure vs. Specific Risk Analysis 
As noted above, significant latent failure is a latent failure which would in combination with one or 
more specific failures, or events result in a hazardous or catastrophic failure conditions. The applicant 
only identified the latent failures, which leave the aircraft one failure away from catastrophic failure 
condition in the thrust reverser CCMR analysis. In other words, only catastrophic failure conditions 
contributed by one latent failure combining with another failure were considered, as illustrated in figure 2. 
Figure 2, the significant latent failure identified by the applicant 
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In aircraft system safety analysis, the latent failures that leave the aircraft one failure away from 
catastrophic failure condition should be assessed in Specific Risk Analysis for certain safety critical 
systems, for instance, flight control, thrust reverser, fuel tank ignition protection, etc.. 
The definition for Specific Risk [5] is: “The risk on a given flight due to a particular condition”. The 
Specific Risks of Concern are when the airplane is one failure away from a catastrophe, or when the risk 
is greater than the average probability criteria provided in AC/AMC 25.1309 Arsenal for hazardous and 
catastrophic failure conditions, on a given flight due to a particular condition. The particular condition 
here includes Master Minimum Equipment List, operating mode, flight condition, design variability, 
flight phase, flight time, diversion or return to land, active failure, latent failure and at risk time, etc.. The 
specific risk analysis aims to assess the system redundancy and residual risk assuming the latent failure 
occurred. Only significant latent failures in the failure combination of a catastrophic failure condition 
should be considered. The purpose is to assure the aircraft still meet the requirement of no single failure 
resulting in catastrophic failure condition after latent failure occurred, and the probability of this 
catastrophic failure condition should be less than 1E-6 flight hour. 
Based on industry practice on several certificated aircrafts, the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 
Committee (ARAC) of United States recommended that the cut off criteria of 1E-12/FH and only 
reviewing two order cut sets to limit the amount of analysis required showing compliance to the specific 
risk criteria. The average risk analysis adequately protects the three or more failure combinations. 
Typically, as for the hydraulic actuated cascade type thrust reverser in transport category aircraft (twin 
engine), the system architecture usually adopts three lines of defense through mechanical, electronically 
and hydraulic locks. There are usually two catastrophic failure conditions contributed by thrust reverser: 
uncommanded thrust reverser deploy in flight, uncommanded thrust reverser restow combined with 
engine control system failed to reduce the engine thrust during rejected take-off or landing. And one 
hazardous failure condition: un-annunciated loss of one thrust reverser during rejected take-off. 
Reviewing the applicant’s CCMR analysis, firstly, they failed to analyze the hazardous failure condition; 
secondly, failed to analyze failure combination of one latent failure plus two or more other failures 
situation in the two catastrophic failure conditions as illustrated in figure 3. 
Figure 3, failure conditions should be analyzed for significant latent failures 
Therefore, the CCMR analysis is unacceptable due to the confusion of specific risk analysis and 
CCMR analysis. 
3.2. CCMR vs. MSG-3 Tasks 
The applicant stated that inspection for certain latent failures had been “added” into MSG-3 analysis as 
a result of the thrust reverser SSA. However, the MSG-3 logic may not consider a failure condition 
containing three or more failures, and if the inspection task is not properly identified as a CCMR by 
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engineering, the Aircraft Evaluation Group (AEG) may make incorrect classification of those 
maintenance tasks. 
It is important to note that CMRs are derived from a fundamentally different analysis process than the 
maintenance tasks and intervals that result from the MSG-3 analysis associated with MRB activities (if 
the MRB process is used). Although both types of analysis may produce equivalent maintenance tasks 
and intervals, it is not always appropriate to substitute a CMR with an MSG-3 task. 
CCMR analysis is part of the system safety analysis to identify required maintenance tasks to meet the 
top event probability. The CMRs selected from CCMRs are to eliminate the exposure of latent failures by 
detecting the failures. While the MSG-3 analysis is to define the maintenance tasks considering safety, 
operational or economic factors, including proactive maintenance or inspection tasks to prevent failures. 
And then follow the specific logical decision flow to determine the safety and operational effect on 
aircraft when latent or dominant failure combined with another failure happened. 
The FAA AC 25-19A clearly defined the relationship between type certification and MRB processes 
as in figure 4. Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) AC 25.1529-1[6] cited the same illustration. 
Though the MSG-3 and CCMR analysis could produce same tasks, equivalent and compatible MSG-3 
tasks (if they exist) may be used to satisfy some of CCMRs, CCMR analysis and MSG-3 are two 
independent works. MSG-3 analysis cannot cover the failure condition in figure 3. And for MSG-3 tasks, 
the operator could escalate task interval based on reliability data collected during the daily maintenance in 
service. But CMR task interval is relatively impervious to escalation. Operators may mistakenly escalate 
a CMR task due to lack of related information. Thus, if a MSG-3 task is used to replace a CMR, the 
related information should be noted to the task to ensure the traceability. 
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Figure 4, Relationship between Type Certification and MRB 
4. Conclusion 
The CCMR analysis process is thoroughly studied and the certification practice is clearly discussed in 
this paper.  
Considering the importance of CCMR analysis, the process should be well understood by both 
applicants and certification specialists. The lessons learned in the certification practice section are very 
good references to other civil aircraft development and type certification programs. 
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